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Comments on Oral Contributions to NIE-45:



- 1. Ref. effects in Burma of Weeded western reverses in Indochina... In view of stiffened attitude of Burmese fovernment toward Burmese Communists, clear denounciation of communism by Burmese Socialist at Asian Socialist Conference and on other occasions, do not believe that Burmese accommation would be "almost certain" Burmese attitude would depend on prospect of effective assistance from the West and India, on the effectiveness of western counter-measures to a reverse in Indochina, and on the nature of Chinese Communist participation at the time in the Indochina development.
- 2. Ref effects in Malaya...Do not believe that internal revolt could develop to "ummanageable proportions" If large numbers of local Chinese became active sympathizers or joined rebels in the field, they would not be able to subsist in the jungle as do the small bands at present. They would have to come out in the open to fight and 50,000 British troops with superior equipment would knock them off. Futhermore, if situation became really desparate, British could employ force much less discriminately than they do 20000 now and coerce the bulk of the Chinese population into passive state until time of an actual CC invasion...which is another question.
- 3. Ref para 6....paragraph as a whole adds up to almost mothing concrete. We are unable to determine the practical extent of Indian influence in Burma. OIR normally alleges that it is considerable, but cannot cite direct evidence. Although Burma's foreigh policy appears to parrallel that of India in many respects at the present time, it appears that Burma is developing its foreign policy on its own, in response to its own peculiar requirements and circumstances. If the paragraph simply means to say that if India went ommunist, Burma would be greatly effected, that is certainly true...but in that case, why not say it.

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Para 9 (see also comments above on Burma) Burmese mines which supply wolfram could not produce substantial tonnages during period of this estimate, even if removed from Karen control tomorrow. Burmese oil production under most favorable circumstances hardly bears mention and there are no prospects of significant increases in either refined or crude products during period of this estimate.

General...It is difficult to comment on this paper since it is not a draft of an estimate, but supposedly only the summary of oral contributions made by the agencies. It covers a great deal of ground not germane to the subject problem, and there are many places in which we would alter, in varying degrees, the emphasis or shade of meaning of sentences and paragraphs if it were an estimate.